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The plaintiffs ("Schoneys"), pursuant to Rules 45-51
of the Utah Rules of the Appellate Procedure, submit this
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
IV.
QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

May the trial courts impose a default judgment

when a party answers interrogatories 13 days late and the delay
is excusable?
2.

Should certiorari be granted when the Court of

Appeals uses immaterial and, heretofore, unrecognized factors
in upholding the sanction of a default judgment for answering
interrogatories 13 days late?
3.
Appeals

Should certiorari be granted when the court of

invents

factors

that

do

not

factually

exist

in

upholding a default judgment sanctions?
V.
REFERENCE TO THE OFFICIAL REPORT
OF THE OPINION ISSUED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS
The opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals is reported
at Schoney v. Memorial Estates, Inc., 132 Utah Adv. Rep. 22
(Ct. App. April 24, 1990).

Hereinafter ("Schoney at

.")

(A

copy of the opinion is attached as Exhibit 1 to the Appendix of
this Petition.)

VI.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The decision sought to be reviewed was entered on
April 6, 1990.

In subsequent orders dated May 3, 1990 and May

16, 1990, this Court granted petitioners up through June 4,
1990 in which

to

file a Petition

for Writ of Certiorari.

Jurisdiction is invoked pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-22(3)(a) and Rules 45-51 of the Utah Rules of the Appellate
Procedure.
VII.
CONTROLLING PROVISIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION, STATUTES,
ORDINANCES AND REGULATIONS
The controlling provisions of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure are 37(d) and 37(b)(2)(c).

The text of the rules is

set forth in Appendix, Exhibit 2.
VIII.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The

Schoneys

brought

this

class

action

alleging

breach of contract, fraud, breach of trust and intentional
infliction
Estates'

of
sale

emotional
of

distress

mausoleum

certified by Judge Fishier.
class.

crypt

arising
space.

out

of

The

Memorial
class

was

Later, Judge Dee decertified the

On the eve of a jury trial, Judge Moffat dismissed the
2

entire Complaint on summary judgment, and entered a default
judgment as a sanction for answering interrogatories 13 days
late.

(Transcript of Proceedings, June 21, 1988 pp. 51, 52,

hereinafter "Tr. p.
The

Utah

.")
Court

of

Appeals

affirmed

the

default

judgment, as a discovery sanction, and ruled it had no need to
consider the propriety of the summary judgment entered by the
trial court.
IX.
STATEMENT OF FACTS RELEVANT TO THE ISSUES
PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

The Schoneys brought their claims individually

and on behalf of the class of consumers of Memorial Estates
Services.

(R. 202, 294.)
2.

The Schoneys served interrogatories on Memorial

Estates on June 17, 1982.

(R. 12.)

Memorial Estates answered

the interrogatories twenty eight (28) days late.
3.

The Schoneys

submitted

(R. 50.)

to Memorial Estates a

request for documents on January 28, 1983.

(R. 197.)

Memorial

Estates never responded to the request.
4.

The

Schoneys

documents on March 1, 1983.
to the request.

served

another

request

for

Memorial Estates never responded

(R. ,225.)

3

5.
1983

Schoneys certified the case for trial „in May of

(R. 263.)

Memorial Estates objected

(R. 269.)

The

Schoneys again certified the case for trial on September 13,
1983.

(R. 390.)

Because of District Judge Leary's, poor

health, and to avoid delay, the Schoneys moved and obtained a
different trial Judge.

(R. 522.)

The Schoneys certified the

case as ready for trial on April 22, 1986.

(R. 1067.)

The

Court entered a scheduling order setting the case for trial, as
a first place setting on February 9, 1987.
suddenly retired effective January

However, Judge Dee

31, 1987.

The Schoneys

requested a pro-tempore judge to prevent delay of the trial.
The request was denied.

(R. 1084, 1085.)

The case was set for

trial on August 24, 1987. Upon Memorial Estates' request for a
continuance, the trial date was postponed to December 7, 1987
and

a

discovery

cut-off

date

of

December

1,

1987

was

established by the trial court.
6.

In June of 1987, Schoneys served another set of

interrogatories and another request for documents.
Estates
September

sought
15,

and

received

1987)

Memorial

Estates

Memorial

Estates

to

did

62

respond

not

partially

November 24, 1987.

a

to

answer
answered

(R. 1166.)
4

day

extension

discovery.

by

Memorial

September

(R.

(until
1121.)

11, 1987.

Schoneys' discovery

on

The Schoneys were forced to

bring a motion to compel answers on December 8, 1987. (R.
1150.)
7.

Schoneys' Motion to Compel was partially granted

by an order entered December 23, 1987.
8.

Upon Memorial Estates' request, the trial was

postponed until February 1, 1988.
9.
continued.

(R. 1187.)

(R. 1139.)

Upon the Court's own motion, the trial was again
(R. 1301.)

10.

Upon Schoneys' request, the case was set for

trial on July 6, 1988.
11.

(R. 1336, 1338, 1360.)

Memorial Estates claims to have mailed a final

set of interrogatories and requests for documents to Schoneys'
counsel on April 29, 1988 (R. 1363), forty days before the
discovery cut-off date set forth in a scheduling order.
p.

3.)

Schoneys'

counsel

said

he

did

discovery until the first week of June.
court blamed the mix-up on the mail.
Estates

acknowledged

discovery on June 15.

receiving

summary

Two

judgment

receive

(Tr. p. 5.)

(Tr. p. 7.)

unsigned

Memorial
motions

Estates
were

the
The

Memorial

answers

to

(Tr. p. 4, In. 20, R. 1398.)

answers were served on June 20, 1988.
12.

not

(Tr.

its

Signed

(R. 1292.)
substantively

denied.

(R.

identical

693,

1301.)

Memorial Estates filed a third Motion for Summary Judgment and
5

Motion for Default Judgment on June 14, 1988.

(R. 1363.)

The

motions

(Transcript

of

were

heard

on

June

21,

1988.

Proceedings, June 21, 1988.)
13.

At the June 21 hearing, the Court admitted it

had not read the file

(Tr. p. 2.)

its $4,000 offer of judgment.

Memorial Estates renewed

The court gave Schoneys' counsel

the Hobson's choice of accepting the $4,000, or suffering the
fate

of

a

summary

and

default

judgment.

The

$4,000 was

rejected and the court granted Memorial Estates' Motions for
Summary and Default Judgment. (Tr. pp. 51, 52.)
14.

The trial court: a) did not find that Schoneys'

short delay in answering the interrogatories was willful; b)
did not find when Schoneys' counsel received the interrogatories;

c) did not examine the interrogatories to determine

whether they were duplicitous of other discovery as alleged by
Schoneys' counsel; and d) never entered an order compelling
discovery.
15.

At the conclusion of the June 21 hearing, the

court said:
.1 think that the rules require, and
that the Gardner case would require that
the motion to strike [as a default
sanction] be granted.
(Tr. pp. 52, 53.)

6

16.

On appeal, the Utah Court of Appeals affirmed

the default judgment and ruled that accordingly it had no need
to consider the propriety of the summary judgment.

Schoney v.

Memorial Estates, Inc., 132 Adv. Rep. 22 (Ct. App. April 24,
1990).
X.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE COURT OF
APPEALS HAS CHANGED THE STANDARD FROM "WILLFUL FAILURE
TO ANSWER DISCOVERY" TO "EXCUSABLE NEGLECT" FOR
IMPOSING DEFAULT JUDGMENT AS A DISCOVERY SANCTION
A.

Introduction.
As set forth in Section IX, paragraphs 2-4 of this

Petition, Memorial Estates repeatedly failed to timely respond
to Schoney's discovery requests.

Some of the requests have

never been responded to by Memorial Estates.

Other Memorial

Estates' delays range from 28 to 132 days.

However, when

Schoneys answered Memorial Estates' last set of interrogatories
(most of which were cumulative) 13 days late, the court entered
a default judgment as a sanction against the Schoneys.
B.

Legal Analysis.
The default judgment sanction was imposed even though

there was not a finding of a willful refusal to answer.
7

The

legal standard for striking a pleading as a discovery sanction
is "a showing of willfulness, bad faith, or fault on the part
of non-complying party.

U.R.C.P. 37(b)(2)(c); First Federal

Savings & Loan Association of Salt Lake City v. Schamack, 684
P.2d 1257, 1266 (Utah 1984).

In every appellate Utah Case that

has considered the issue, the Utah Courts have unanimously and
unequivocally required some showing of a willful failure to
respond.

Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 396 P.2d 410 (Utah

1964); Carman v. Salvens, 546 P.2d

601

(Utah 1976); Arnica

Mutual Insurance Co. v. Schettler, 768 P.2d 950 (Utah 1989).
A review of federal decisions construing identical
discovery rules shows that a default judgment is never entered
.as a sanction unless: a) there is bad faith; or b) a willful
failure to respond to the request; or c) a failure to respond
to a court order to produce discovery.

e.g., Local Union No.

251 v. Town Line Sand and Gravel, Inc., 511 F.2d 1198 (1st Cir.
1975); Edgar v. Slaughter, 548 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1977); Ohio
v. Crofters, Inc., 75 F.R.D. 12 (D. Colo. 1977).

Re Attorney

General of United States, 596 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1979).
In summary, Schoneys cannot find a case where a Utah
or federal court has upheld a default judgment as a discovery
sanction without a finding of bad faith or willful conduct.
Neither could the Court of Appeals.
8

In this case, the trial court ruled that W.W. & W.B.
Gardner, Inc. v. Park West Village, Inc., 568 P.2d 734 (Utah
1977) required the entry of a default judgment.
•

*

•

I think that the Gardner case would require
that the motion to strike be granted. (Tr.
51, 52.)
The

trial

court's

error

is

clear

and

complete.

Gardner upheld a default judgment against a party whose defense
was

without

merit

and

whose

"persistent

frustrated the judicial process."

dilatory

tactics

Gardner, at 737.

Gardner

did not require a default judgment when there was no persistent
dilatory conduct.

Of course, no judicial deference is given

the lower court when the lower court misapplies the law.

e.g.,

Lopez v. Schwendiman, 720 P.2d 778, 780 (Utah 1986).
C.

Factual Background.
In this case, the trial court did not make a finding

of wilful

failure to

answer because there was none.

The

relevant transcript shows:
a)

Memorial Estates claims to have served interrogatories

on

April

29th,

discovery cut-off date.
b)

40

days

before

the

(Tr. p. 3.)

Schon^ys' counsel did not receive the interrogatories.

(Tr. p. 5.)
9

c)

Schoneys' counsel was on vacation from June 3 to
June 12. During the vacation, Memorial Estates'
counsel called the office of Schoneys' counsel
to see if there was a mix-up.
that

Schoneys' counsel

interrogatories,

he

had

sent

not

over

Upon learning
received
another

the

copy.

(Tr. p. 5, 6.)
d)

Schoneys' counsel returned from vacation on June
12 and within 3 days submitted unsigned answers
to Memorial Estates.

Signed answers were send

one week later. (Tr. p. 6, 3.)
e)

The court blamed the mix-up on the mail:
It's a constant darn problem about mailing
and at times, I, with lesser counsel, have
some problems about veracity.
It is
really a problem with mailing.
I don't
know what we're going to do about it. . . .
(Tr. p. 7.)

Based on the foregoing, the court entered the default
judgment of Schoneys

as a sanction for answering interrog-

atories 13 days late.

No comparable sanction was ever imposed

on Memorial Estates for its much longer delays in responding to
discovery.

The decision was upheld by the Court of Appeals

without citing a single case except for W.W. & W.B. Gardner.
No other reported case on the planet has upheld a default
judgment on comparable facts.
10

POINT II
CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE COURT
OF APPEALS USED IMMATERIAL AND HERETOFORE NEVER RECOGNIZED
FACTORS IN UPHOLDING THE SANCTIONS OF A DEFAULT
JUDGMENT FOR ANSWERING INTERROGATORIES 13 DAYS LATE
The

Court

of

Appeals

listed

several

factors

upholding the trial court's default judgment sanction.

in

A major

factor in the Court's reasoning was that Schoneys had amended
their complaint 5 times.

(Slip opinion at p. 2.)

Because of the complicated procedural history, the
operative
However,

complaint
the

Court

was

titled

"Fifth

of

Appeals

was

Amended

wrong

to

plaintiffs had amended the complaint five times.

Complaint."
infer

that

In fact, the

court had granted three motions to amend.
Furthermore, the court was wrong to infer that there
was something improper about multiple amendments.
in a complex case.)
clarify issues.

(Especially

One of the amendments was simply to

(See Exhibit 3.)

In at least one instance,

plaintiff was required to amend simply because there had been a
change in circumstances during the lengthy litigation.

(See

Exhibit 4.)
It's true that the number of amended complaints may
be a factor in deciding whether (1) allow a party to amend
again.

see generally, Merican, Inc. v. Caterpillar Tractor
11

Co.,

596 F.Supp. 697 ' (E.D.P.A. 1984); or

complaint for failure to state a claim.
Hill, 2 Utah 2d 20, 268 P.2d

(2) to dismiss a

Davis Stock Co. v.

988 (Utah 1954); Letizia v.

Prudential Bache Securities, Inc., 802 F.2d
1986).

1185

(9th Cir.

However, no court has ever used the number of amended

complaints to decide whether a sanction of default judgment
should be imposed for answering interrogatories 13 days late.
POINT III
CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE COURT OF
APPEALS MANUFACTURED, OUT OF THIN AIR, FACTORS FOR
SUPPORTING THE SANCTION OF A DEFAULT JUDGMENT FOR
ANSWERING INTERROGATORIES 13 DAYS LATE
One of the factors listed by the Court of Appeals
were dealt with in Point II of this Argument.

The remaining

factors listed by the Court of Appeals were:
a)

That plaintiffs had "narrowly" escaped summary
judgment.

b)

That

plaintiffs

were

"in

effect,

living

on

borrowed time."
c)

That the court was "growing short on patience
and determined to keep plaintiffs on a short
tether."

d)

Schoneys were, ". . .somewhat uneven in discharging their burden of prosecuting the case."
12

e)

Schoneys' untimely compliance with the discovery
requests

necessarily

compromised

defendants'

ability to have the information necessary to go
to trial.
f)

Schoneys made it impossible for Memorial Estates
to conduct follow-up discovery.

g)

Schoneys missed the discovery cut-off date by 4
days.

The first four reasons (a-d) are completely contrary
to the Record.

The trial judge acknowledged that Schoneys had

vigorously prosecuted the case (see page 7 of this Petition).
Further, of the six trial continuances granted, only one was
made at the request of the Schoneys.
Argument.

See Point IV of this

The musing of the Court of Appeals about "living on

borrowed time," and "a short tether," and "narrowly escaping
summary judgment" were spun out of thin air with absolutely no
basis in the Record.

Indeed, the Record is to the contrary.

(See fact section above.)

It was the defendants who were

dragging their feet.
Further, there is nothing in the Record that shows
Memorial Estates did not have the information it needed to go
to trial.
They

only

In fact, Memorial Estates never made that claim.
said

that

Gardner,
13

supra

required

a

default

judgment.

(Tr. p. 5.)

Schoneys, on the other hand, claimed

that the interrogatories were, for the most part, duplicitous
of previous discovery.
Finally,

the

(Tr. p. 6.)
earliest

interrogatory answers was June 2.
14.

possible

due

date

for the

Schoneys answered on June

Even if Schoneys had answered on June 2, Memorial Estates

still could not have conducted further discovery because the
discovery cut-off date was June 10. The rules allow a party 30
days to respond to discovery.

There were only 8 days between

June 2 and June 10.
It is axiomatic that the factual findings of a trial
court must

be

supported by

some evidence.

e.g., Western

Capitol

& Securities, Inc. v. Knudviq, 768 P.2d

1989).

The factual findings in an appellate opinion also must

be supported by some evidence.
Rules of Appellate Procedure.

989

(Utah

c.f., Rule 30 of the Utah

This is because a factual ruling

by an appellate court is binding on the lower courts.

e.g.,

Cousins v. City Council of Chicago, 361 F.Supp. 530 (N.D. 111.
1973).

In this case, there is nothing to support the factors

listed above.
It's true that Schoneys missed by 4 days the discovery cut-off date set forth in the scheduling order.

But

the court and Memorial Estates also violated the scheduling
14

order by hearing dispositive motions less than 30 days before
trial.

(Tr. p. 7.)
In summary, all of the factors listed by the Court of

Appeals

in

upholding

the

discovery

sanction

of

a default

judgment are:
a)

immaterial and unrecognized by other courts;

b)

made up; or

c)

at best, inconsequential.
POINT IV

CERTIORARI IS APPROPRIATE BECAUSE THE COURT
OF APPEALS HAS USURPED THE POWER OF THE TRIAL COURT
It

is

axiomatic

that

discretion in discovery matters.

the

trial

court

has broad

However, that discretion lies

in the trial court - - not the Court of Appeals!
of the trial court to exercise discretion.

It is the job

It is the job of

the appellate court to review for abuse of discretion.
This case turns that orderly judicial process on its
head.

The trial court judge exercised no discretion.

The

trial court judge merely concluded that: "• . .the Gardner case
would require that the motion to strike be granted."
53.)

(Tr. 52-

The Court of Appeals then invented reasons to support the

conclusion of the trial court.

15

The

Opinion

of

the

Court

of

Appeals .would

be

appropriate if it had been a memorandum decision of a trial
court judge.

If Judge Moffat

(the trial court judge) had

entered such a detailed memorandum decision, an appellate court
could

review.

conclusion.
court —

Here

the

trial

court

judge

It was the Court of Appeals —

gave

a

bare

and not the trial

who exercised discretion.
POINT V

CERTIORARI SHOULD BE GRANTED BECAUSE THE TRIAL COURT
AND THE COURT OF APPEALS HAVE DEPARTED FROM THE
ACCEPTABLE AND USUAL COURSE OF JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS
The ruling of the trial court and the opinion of the
Court of Appeals have clearly and completely departed from the
acceptable and usual course of judicial proceedings.

(See Rule

46(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.)
In particular, Judge Moffat

didn't even read the

file:
.We have a Motion for Summary Judgment. Haven't had a chance to look at the
file. . . .
(June 21, 1988 Transcript at p. 2, Lines 4-5.)
Thus, Judge Moffat could not follow his duty to,
". . .carefully scrutinize the submissions and contentions..."
Rich v. McGovern, 551 P.2d

1266 (Utah 1976).

Under lesser

circumstances, federal courts have reversed summary judgments.
16

Reiser v. Coliseum Properties, Inc.f 614 F.2d 406 (5th Cir.
1980); Stepanischen v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Corp., 722
F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1983).
In the end, the trial court judge based his ruling on
the case of W.W. & W.B. Gardner v. Park West Village, Inc.,
supra.

However, since the trial judge had not read the file,

he could not have read the case either.
was handed to the judge at the hearing.

No copy of the case
Rather, the trial

judge simply accepted the defendants' interpretation of the
case.

Thus, without even reading he case, the trial judge

concluded: "I thing that the Gardner case would require that
the motion to strike be granted."
During

the

issues were examined:

course

of

(Tr. 51-52.)
the

hearing, numerous

fact

viz. whether defendant's interrogatories

were lost or delayed in the mail (June 21, 1988 Tr. p. 5, Lines
18-25); whether Memorial Estates ever made a suggestion of
death on the Record (June 21 Tr. at p. 11, Lines 17-20; p. 12,
Lines 10-13); whether a $4,000 offer of judgment would satisfy
all of Schoney's claims (June 21 Tr. at p. 14, Lines 7-11);
whether Schoneys were shown a picture of the mausoleum before
it was constructed (June 21 Tr. at p. 15, Lines 2-13); whether
the Schoneys were shown a rendering of a mausoleum (June 21 Tr.
at p. 16, Lines 20-25); whether the mausoleums at Mountain View
17

and Redwood Road were the same (June 21 Tr. at p. 17f .Lines 1115); whether the construction of a mausoleum at Redwood Road
put the Schoneys on notice that a later mausoleum at Mountain
View would be of the same quality (June 21 Tr. at p. 18, Lines
6-10); whether a chapel has always been available at Mountain
View (June 21 Tr. at p. 18, Line 22, p. 19f Line 5); whether it
was reasonable

for Schoneys to purchase alternate mausoleum

space (at Sunset Lawn) (June 21 Tr. at p. 27); whether Memorial
Estates sold more crypts than had been constructed (June 21 Tr.
at

p.

31,, Lines

1-4); whether

the

Schoneys

purchased

a

mausoleum at Redwood Road or Mountain View (June 21 Tr. at p.
36 and 37); whether Memorial Estates properly accounted for
trust

funds

(June

21 Tr.

at

p. 43, Lines

8-22);

whether

Memorial Estates held a dead corpse as a hostage (June 21 Tr.
at p. 46, Lines 1-9); whether Memorial Estates told Schoneys
that their money would be held in trust (June 21 Tr. at p. 46,
Lines

10-19);

whether

Memorial

Estates

represented

that a

mausoleum would be built when there were no plans to do so
(June 21 Tr. at p. 47, Lines 1-7); whether it was reasonable
for Memorial

Estates

to substitute

an LDS

chapel

for the

Schoneys, who were a non-LDS family (June 21 Tr. at p. 48,
Lines 12-22); whether a chapel was available at both Mountain
View and Redwood

Road

(June 21 Tr. at p. 51, Lines 1-3);
18

whether

Memorial

Estates

was

prejudiced

because

Schoney

answered interrogatories approximately 13 days late.

(June 21

Tr. at p. 5, Lines 1-15.)
In summary, it was clear error for Judge Moffat to
grant

summary

judgment

and

a

default

judgment

in

such a

complicated case, without even reading the file, the interrogatories, or the Gardner case.
XI.
CONCLUSION
Certiorari should be granted when:
a)

The

Court

of Appeals

decides

a question

in

conflict with a decision of this Court; or
b)

The

Court

of

Appeals

decides

an

important

question of law which should be settled by the Utah Supreme
Court; or
c)

The Court of Appeals renders a decision which

calls of this Court's power of supervision.
The Court of Appeals, in this
standard

for

imposing

a

default

case, changed the

judgment

as

sanction from willfulness to excusable neglect.
conflicts with prior decisions of this Court.

a

discovery

The decision

Further, if the

change in standard is going to be made, this Court should make
it.
19

Finally, the Court of Appeals' use of immaterial or
invented factors in upholding the default judgment.
DATED this

Y

day of June, 1990.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants
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EXHIBIT 1

FILED
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
, Noontn
C\Sfi\l\ *** Court
Uteh C#urt rf Appeals

ooOoo
George K. Schoney and Erma J.
Schoney, et al.,
OPINION

Plaintiffs and Appellants,

(For Publication)
v.
Memorial Estates, Inc., et al.,

Case No. 880630-CA

Defendants and Respondents.

Third District, Salt Lake County
The Honorable Richard H. Moffat
Attorneys: Daniel F. Bertch and Robert J. DeBry, Salt Lake City,
for Appellants
Earl Jay Peck and Stephen L. Henriod, Salt Lake City,
for Respondents

Before Judges Billings, Garff, and Orme.
ORME, Judge:
Plaintiffs, the Schoneys,1 appeal from the trial
court's judgment in favor of defendant Memorial Estates. The
judgment was based on two independent grounds: 1) Summary
judgment on the merits and 2) default judgment for failure to
respond timely to a discovery request. We affirm as to the
default judgment and accordingly have no need to consider the
propriety of the summary judgment.
1. During the long course of this case, appellant George K.
Schoney died. One issue on appeal is whether the trial court
erred in dismissing the action as to him on the theory a
suggestion of death was made on the record but no timely
substitution of party was made. In view of our disposition of
the case, we need not reach that issue. For convenience, in
this opinion we will refer to plaintiffs in the plural.

FIF F nnpv

AVAILABILITY OF SANCTION
The trial court entered default judgment against
plaintiffs because they failed to comply with a discovery
request within the time permitted by the rules and within the
time provided by the court's order imposing a discovery
cut-off. The entry of default judgment as a sanction based on
failure to fulfill discovery obligations is within the
discretion of the trial court. C. Wright and A. Miller,
Federal Practice and Procedure § 2291, at 812-13, 817 (1970).
Management of the actions pending before it is uniquely the
business of the trial court and while an appellate court may,
of course, intervene if discretion is abused, we accord trial
courts considerable latitude in this regard and considerable
deference to their determinations concerning discovery.
Rule 37(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure allows a
court to impose sanctions against a party for disregarding
discovery obligations even when that party has not directly
violated a court order specifically compelling discovery.2
[Rule 37(d)] allows the court in which the
action is pending, on motion, to impose a
variety of sanctions on a party who . . .
has failed to serve answers or objections
to interrogatories submitted under Rule 33
«

.

.

.

No court order is required to bring
Rule 37(d) into play. It is enough that
. . . a set of interrogatories . . . has
been properly served on the party.
C. Wright and A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2291,
at 807 (1970). The possible sanctions the court may impose
include those listed in paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Utah R.
Civ. P. 37(b)(2). Paragraph 37(b)(2) states: "[T]he court in
which the action is pending may make such orders in regard to
the failure [to fulfill discovery obligations] as are just, and
among others the following: . . . (C) . . . rendering a
judgment by default against the disobedient party."

2. By contrast, Utah R. Civ. P. 37(b) authorizes discovery
sanctions only where particular kinds of court orders have been
violated.

that everyone, including the court,3 shares some blame for
this delay. Nonetheless, there was no counterclaim in this
case, and the primary responsibility for moving the case along
rested with plaintiffs. Plaintiffs were, at best, somewhat
uneven in discharging their burden of prosecuting the case in a
timely fashion during its five-year life at the trial
level.4
Third, the court itself had become involved in the
discovery process, unqualifiedly indicating its desire to bring
the lengthy proceedings to an end. The court had imposed an
order fixing a cut-off date for discovery. While such an order
is not on precisely the same footing as an order actually
compelling discovery by a particular date, it is clearly
analogous.
Finally, the trial date set by the court was only a few
weeks beyond the discovery cut-off date. Plaintiffs' untimely
compliance with the discovery request necessarily compromised
defendant's ability to have the information necessary to go
forward with trial on the date set by the court.5 Moreover,
the untimeliness of plaintiffs' answers effectively precluded

3. Various proceedings in this case were heard by five
different trial judges. The retirement of one judge
effectively cost plaintiffs a prior trial setting.
4. CJL. Maxfield v. Rushton, 779 P.2d 237, 241 (Utah Ct. App.
1989) (Orme, J., concurring specially) (when case had been
pending for almost ten years, length of time the action had
been pending was a relevant consideration in court's sua sponte
decision that case should be dismissed).
5.
Plaintiffs argue no prejudice actually resulted because
the interrogatories sought information which was duplicative,
extraneous, and unimportant. If this were true, a timely
objection or motion for protective order would have been in
order. Neither was made. We decline to consider this
contention for the first time on appeal. See, e.g., Zions
First Nat'l Bank v. National Am. Title Ins. Co.. 749 P.2d 651,
655 (Utah 1988). See also C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal
Practice and Procedure § 2291, at 810-11 (1970) ("A party may
not defend against sanctions under Rule 37(d) by contending
that the request for discovery was improper or objectionable.
If he takes this view, he is required to apply for a protective
order under Rule 26(c).").
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and Appellants,
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Case No. C82-4983.
April 6, 1990, - Opinion by Judge Gregory K. Orme
Concurred: Judge Judith M. Billings
Judge Regnal W. Garff
This cause having been heretofore argued and submitted, and the
Court being sufficiently advised in the premises, it is now
ordered, adjudged and decreed that the judgment of the trial
court herein be, and the same is, affirmed.
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I hereby certify that on the 6th day of April, 1990, a true and
correct copy of.the attached opinion was mailed to each of the above
parties and to the trial court.
Julia Whitfield'
Deputy Clerk 'w '

EXHIBIT 2

"Rule 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanctions.
(a) Motion for order compelling discovery. A party, upon reasonable
notice to other parties and all persons affected thereby, may apply for an order
compelling discovery as follows:
(1) Appropriate court. An application for an order to a party may be
made to the court in which the action is pending, or, on matters relating
to a deposition, to the court in the district where the deposition is being
taken. An application for an order to a deponent who is not a party shall
be made to the court in the district where the deposition is being taken.
(2) Motion. If a deponent fails to answer a question propounded or
submitted under Rule 30 or 31, or a corporation or other entity fails to
make a designation under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a), or a party fails to answer
an interrogatory submitted under Rule 33, or if a party, in response to a
request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, fails to respond that
inspection will be permitted as requested or fails to permit inspection as
requested, the discovering party may move for an order compelling an
answer, or a designation, or an order compelling inspection in accordance
with the request. When taking a deposition on oral examination, the
proponent of the question may complete or adjourn the examination before he applies for an order.
If the court denies the motion in whole or in part, it may make such
protective order as it would have been empowered to make on a motion
made pursuant to Rule 26(c).
(3) Evasive or incomplete answer. For purposes of this subdivision
an evasive or incomplete answer is to be treated as a failure to answer.
(4) Award of expenses of motion. If the motion is granted, the court
shall, after opportunity for hearing, require the party or deponent whose
conduct necessitated the motion or the party or attorney advising such
conduct or both of them to pay to the moving party the reasonable expenses incurred in obtaining the order, including attorney fees, unless the
court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified or
that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
If the motion is denied, the court shall, after opportunity for hearing,
require the moving party or the attorney advising the motion or both of
them to pay to the party or deponent who opposed the motion the reasonable expenses incurred in opposing the motion, including attorney fees,
unless the court finds that the making of the motion was substantially
justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust.
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If the motion is granted in part and denied in part, the court may
apportion the reasonable expenses incurred in relation to the motion
among the parties and persons in a just manner.
(b) Failure to comply with order.
(1) Sanctions by court in district where deposition is taken. If a
deponent fails to be sworn or to answer a question after being directed to
do so by the court in the district in which the deposition is being taken,
the failure may be considered a contempt of that court.
(2) Sanctions by court in which action is pending. If a party or an
officer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated
under Rule 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails to obey an
order to provide or permit discovery, including an order made under Subdivision (a) of this rule or Rule 35, or if a party fails to obey an order
entered under Rule 26(f), the court in which the action is pending may
make such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others
the following:
(A) an order that the matters regarding which the order was made
or any other designated facts shall be taken to be established for the
purposes of the action in accordance with the claim of the party obtaining the order;
(B) an order refusing to allow the disobedient party to support or
oppose designated claims or defenses, or prohibiting him from introducing designated matters in evidence;
(C) an order striking out pleadings or parts thereof, staying further proceedings until the order is obeyed, dismissing the action or
proceeding or any part thereof, or rendering a judgment by default
against the disobedient party;
(D) in lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, an
order treating as a contempt of court the failure to obey any orders
except an order to submit to a physical or mental examination;
(E) where a party has failed to comply with an order under Rule
35(a) requiring him to produce another for examination, such orders
as are listed in Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of this subdivision, unless
the party failing to comply shows that he is unable to produce such
person for examination.
In lieu of any of the foregoing orders or in addition thereto, the court
shall require the party failing to obey the order or the attorney advising
him or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney fees,
caused by the failure, unless the court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other circumstances make an award of expenses
unjust,
(c) Expenses on failure to admit. If a party fails to admit the genuineness
of any document or the truth of any matter as requested under Rule 36, and if
the party requesting the admissions thereafter proves the genuineness of the
document or the truth of the matter, he may apply to the court for an order
requiring the other party to pay him the reasonable expenses incurred in
making that proof, including reasonable attorney's fees. The court shall make
the order unless it finds that (1) the request was held objectionable pursuant
to Rule 36(a), or (2) the admission sought was of no substantial importance, or
(3) the party failing to admit had reasonable ground to believe that he might
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Rule 37

>vail on the matter, or (4) there was other good reason for the failure to
mit.
d) Failure of party to attend at own deposition or serve answers to
;errogatories or respond to request for inspection. If a party or an
icer, director, or managing agent of a party or a person designated under
le 30(b)(6) or 31(a) to testify on behalf of a party fails (1) to appear before
> officer who is to take his deposition, after being served with a proper
tice, or (2) to serve answers or objections to interrogatories submitted under
le 33, after proper service of the interrogatories, or (3) to serve a written
ponse to a request for inspection submitted under Rule 34, after proper
•vice of the request, the court in which the action is pending on motion may
tke such orders in regard to the failure as are just, and among others it may
:e any action authorized under Paragraphs (A), (B), and (C) of Subdivision
(2) of this rule. In lieu of any order or in addition thereto, the court shall
luire the party failing to act or the attorney advising him or both to pay the
isonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless
> court finds that the failure was substantially justified or that other cirnstances make an award of expenses unjust.
The failure to act described in this subdivision may not be excused on the
>und that the discovery sought is objectionable unless the party failing to
> has applied for a protective order as provided by Rule 26(c).
e) Failure to participate in the framing of a discovery plan. If a party
his attorney fails to participate in good faith in the framing of a discovery
.n by agreement as is required by Rule 26(f), the court may, after opportuy for hearing, require such party or his attorney to pay to any other party
\ reasonable expenses, including attorney fees, caused by the failure,
nended effective Jan. 1, 1987.)
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ROBERT J. DEBRY
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorney for Plaintiff
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2
Salt Lake City, Utah, 8 4117
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE K. SCHONEY and
ERMA J. SCHONEY, for
themselves and all others
similarly situated,

]
'

Plaintiffs, 1
I

MOTION TO
AMEND COMPLAINT

vs.
MEMORIAL ESTATES, INC. and,
\
MEMORIAL ESTATES CEMETERY
',
DEVELOPMENT CORP., corporation and JOHN DOES 1 through
10, individuals,
Defendants

(Judge David B. Dee)

Civil No.

C"82-4983

COKES NOW the plaintiff, and moves pursuant to
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, that leave of
court be granted to amend plaintiffs* Complaint as set forth
in the attached, proposed Third Amended Complaint.
The grounds for this motion are that allowance of
the amendment is in the interest of justice.
Specifically, plaintiffs seek to amend count five
to more specifically plead unjust enrichment on the part of
the defendants.

Allowance of the amendment will not prejudice the
defendants, nor delay the upcoming trial.
DATED this
day of

19a£.

ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiffs

By:

2

Ub&J- /jA~*

7

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Motion to Amend Complaint, (George K. Schoney, et
al vs. Memorial Estates, et al, Civil No. C-82-4983)/ was
mailed this /&

day of

Si/^^t

, 1984, by depositing same

in the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following:

Arthur H. Nielsen
Joseph L. Henriod
David Swope
NIELSON & SENIOR
P.O. Box 11808
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

~~y?^J^r
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EXHIBIT 4

ROBERT J. DEBRY - A0 84 9
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff
965 East 4800 South, Suite 2
Salt Lake City, Utah
84117
Telephone: (801) 262-8915
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GEORGE K. SCHONEY and
ERMA J. SCHONEY, for
themselves and all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiffs,

MOTION TO AMEND

vs.
MEMORIAL ESTATES, INC. and
MEMORIAL ESTATES CEMETERY
DEVELOPMENT CORP., corporation and JOHN DOES 1
through 10, individually,

Civil No. C82-4983
(Judge David B. Dee)

Defendants.
Plaintiff respectfully moves to file the Fourth
Amended Complaint (a copy of which is filed herewith).
The grounds for the motion are that defendants have
only recently disclosed that the mausoleum space at issue
in this case is finally (after 12 years) under construction.
Furthermore, defendants have only recently completed another
mausoleum at the Redwood location for other class members.

FILE COPY

This late construction substantially changes many of the
theories of liability and damages in the case.

Furthermore,

defendants are not prejudiced because there has been no
discovery cutoff and no trial date has been set.
DATED this

28th

day of February, 1985.
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES
Attorneys for Plaintiff

By:

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the
foregoing MOTION TO AMEND, was hand delivered this
day of February, 1985 to the following:

Arthur H. Nielsen
Joseph L. Henriod
David Swope
NIELSON & SENIOR
P.O. Box 11808
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

28th

